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According to the dividend signalling hypothesis, dividend change announcements 
trigger share returns because they convey information about management’s assessment 
on firms’ future prospects.  
We analyse the classical assumptions of the dividend signalling hypothesis, using data 
from three European countries. The evidence gives no support to a positive relation 
between dividend change announcements and the market reaction for French firms, and 
only weak support for the Portuguese and UK firms. After accounting for non-linearity 
in the mean reversion process, the global results do not give support to the assumption 
that dividend change announcements are positively related with future earnings 
changes. 
We also formulate two hypotheses in order to explore the window dressing phenomenon 
and the maturity hypothesis, finding some evidence in favour of both, especially in the 
UK market.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important assumptions of the signalling hypothesis is that dividend 
change announcements are positively correlated with share price reactions and future 
changes in earnings.  
Miller and Modigliani (1961) sustain that, in a perfect capital market, firm value is 
independent of the dividend policy. However, some years latter, Bhattacharya (1979), 
John and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock (1985) developed the signalling theory 
classic models, showing that, in a world of asymmetric information, better informed 
insiders use the dividend policy as a costly signal to convey their firm’s future prospect 
to less informed outsiders. So, a dividend increase signals an improvement on firm’s 
performance, while a decrease suggests a worsening of its future profitability. 
Consequently, a dividend increase (decrease) should be followed by an improvement 
(reduction) in a firm’s profitability, earnings and growth. Moreover, there should be a 
positive relationship between dividend changes and subsequent share price reaction.  
There have been a significant number of empirical tests showing that dividend change 
announcements are positively associated with share returns in the days surrounding the 
dividend change announcement. Pettit (1972, 1976) found strong support that dividend 
change announcements convey information to the market. Similar results were obtained 
by several authors, such as Aharony and Swary (1980), Benesh, Keown and Pinkerton 
(1984) and Dhillon and Johnson (1994) for dividend change announcements, Asquith 
and Mullins (1983) for dividend initiations, Lee and Ryan (2000, 2002) for dividend 
initiations and omissions and Lippert, Nixon and Pilotte (2000) for dividend increase 
announcements. Although all these studies were carried out for the American market, 
Travlos, Trigeorgis and Vafaes (2001) analyzed the market of Cyprus, Gurgul, Madjosz 
and Mestel (2003), the Austrian market, and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), the Turkish 
market, finding also support for the dividend information content hypothesis. 
Although there is empirical evidence supporting the positive relationship between 
dividend change announcements and the subsequent share price reaction, some studies 
have cast doubt on this idea. Studies by Lang and Litzenberger (1989) and Benartzi, 
Michaely and Thaler (1997) for the American market, Conroy, Eades and Harris (2000) 
for the Japanese market, Chen, Firth and Gao (2002) for the Chinese market and 
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Abeyratna and Power (2002), for the United Kingdom, find no evidence of a significant 
relationship between dividend announcements and share returns. 
It is well documented that dividend change announcements are positively associated 
with future earnings. Aharony and Dotan (1994), Chen and Wu (1999), Nissim and Ziv 
(2001), Arnott and Asness (2001, 2003), Harada and Nguyen (2005), Baker, Mukherjee 
and Paskelian (2206), Stacescu (2006) and Vivian (2006), among others, analysed the 
case of dividend changes, concluding that there is a strong association between dividend 
changes and subsequent earnings. Similar results were obtained by Lipson, Maquieira 
and Megginson (1998) for the case of dividend initiations, and by Dhillon, Raman and 
Ramírez (2003) that have considered dividend analysts forecasts in order to determine 
dividend surprises.  
However, many empirical studies have failed to support this idea. Studies by Watts 
(1973), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1992, 1996), Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler 
(1997), Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002), Benartzi et al. (2005) and Lie 
(2005) find little or no evidence that dividend changes predict abnormal increases in 
earnings.  
Using a sample of three very different European markets, Portugal, France and the UK, 
we try to provide further evidence on the roles of the dividend signalling hypotheses in 
explaining the information content of dividend change announcements, as well as on the 
maturity hypothesis.  
Globally, the empirical results do not give support to the dividend signalling content 
hypothesis, but we find some evidence for both the window dressing phenomenon and 
the maturity hypothesis, especially in the UK market. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses. 
The sample selection is described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical 




In the first hypothesis, we analyse the relationship between dividend change 
announcements and the share price movements around dividend announcements. To do 
so, we formulate the following alternative hypothesis: 
H1: “Dividend changes are associated with a subsequent share price reaction in 
the same direction”  
This hypothesis reflects the signalling theory assumption that dividend announcements 
convey information to the market about firm’s future profitability. Consistent with this 
theory, a positive relation should exist between dividend changes and the subsequent 
share price reaction.  
In the second hypothesis, we examine the relationship between dividend change 
announcements and the firm’s future profitability. The testable hypothesis, in its 
alternate form, is:   
H2: “Dividend increases (decreases) are associated with superior (inferior) 
future performance”  
Rejection of the null hypothesis associated with H2 is consistent with the dividend 
signalling model assumption that management has proprietary information concerning 
the firm’s future performance prospects.  
We consider different measures of future performance, in order to examine distinct 
features of dividend policy. Consequently, we formulate several sub-hypotheses: 
H2A: “Dividend increases (decreases) are associated with future earnings 
increases (decreases)”  
H2B: “Dividend increases (decreases) are associated with superior (inferior) 
future performance measures”  
H2C: “Dividend increases are associated with superior operating performance, 
increases in capital expenditure and should experience an increase in 
sales growth”  
H2A considers future earnings changes as future performance. Although we expect a 
positive relation between dividend changes and future earnings changes, the prior 
empirical evidence is not consistent.  
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H2B considers as firms’ future performance other accounting performance measures 
such as profitability measures (return on assets and return on equity), financial risk 
measures such as liquidity ratios and debt ratios, as well as a cash flow measure. This 
will allow us to address issues concerning the window dressing phenomenon. If we 
reject the null hypothesis associated with H2B, and the relation between dividend 
changes and future performance measures is direct, the results will be consistent with 
the dividend signalling model. If we reject the null hypothesis associated with H2B but 
the relation between the variables is negative, we can have evidence of the presence of 
the window dressing phenomenon. On the other hand, if we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis, it may suggest that dividends may not always contain information about 
future profitability.  
Finally, H2C, formulated according to the assumptions of dividend signalling models, 
analyses and confronts the maturity and the signalling hypotheses2. If we reject the null 
hypothesis associated with H2C, and the relation between dividend changes and future 
measures considered in the hypothesis is direct, as the hypothesis predicts, the results 
will be consistent with the dividend signalling model. If we reject the null hypothesis 
associated with H2C but the relation between the variables is negative, we can have 
evidence of the maturity hypothesis. On the other hand, if we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis, we will find no support for either the signalling or the maturity hypotheses. 
3. SAMPLE SELECTION  
We choose to examine different European markets, so we opt to explore the UK, the 
French and the Portuguese markets. Although they are all European markets, they are 
different from each other for several reasons.  
Firstly, the UK is one of the most important European capital markets and is more 
comparable with US studies. The French and the Portuguese markets are smaller, 
particularly the last one, and they are less intensively researched. Secondly, we have 
                                                 
2 Consistent with the maturity hypothesis suggested by Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002), a 
dividend increase may convey information about a decrease in investment opportunities, an expected 
decrease in the return on assets or a decrease in the earnings growth rate, conveying also information 
about the decrease of the systematic risk because of less riskier investments.  
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differences in these countries associated with the equity ownership, which is more 
concentrated in Portugal and France than in the UK. Thirdly, Portugal and France 
present a financial model based on a banking system, whereas the UK is more market-
based, like the US. Finally, legal protection is also different in these countries. Whereas 
the UK is a country of Anglo-Saxon influence, the other two countries are characterised 
by a Continental European influence.  
Given these features, we expect to find more similarity between the French and the 
Portuguese markets rather than between the UK and the other two markets, finding also 
weaker support to the dividend signalling theory in Portugal and France than in the UK. 
The claim here is that, in the UK, the agency conflict between firm insiders and 
dispersed shareholders would be more serious than in the other countries. 
The sample is drawn from dividend announcements of firms listed on the Euronext 
Lisbon (EL), Euronext Paris (EP) and London Stock Exchange (LSE). Announcement 
dates are available on Bloomberg database and all other needed information is available 
on Datastream database. For the French and the UK markets, we consider the dividend 
announcements between 1994 and 2002, and for the Portuguese market we consider the 
dividend announcements between 1988 and 20023.  
To be included in the final sample, the dividend announcements must satisfy the 
following criteria: 
1) The firm is not a financial institution; 
2) The firm is listed on the respective stock exchanges the year before and two 
years after the dividend events; 
3) The company paid an ordinary dividend in the current and previous year; 
4) The firm’s financial data is available on the Datastream database (or the Dathis 
database in the case of Portugal) at the year before and two years after the 
dividend events and announcement dates are available on Bloomberg database;  
                                                 
3 The year of 1994 is conditioned by the availability of announcement dates on Bloomberg database. For 
the Portuguese sample we consider a longer period, in order to maximise the number of observations, 
since this is a small market, with a small number of dividend events. Because Bloomberg and Datastream 
lack information on the Portuguese market, we obtain data from Dhatis, an EL database and we also 
needed to collect some financial statements directly from the companies.  
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5) For the Portuguese and French market, we consider that the firms’ earnings 
announcements or other contaminate announcements, such as stock splits, stock 
dividends and mergers, did not occur within 5 trading days of the dividend 
announcement. For the UK market we exclude all these announcements, except 
the case of earnings announcements4.  
Our sample events include dividend increases, no changes and decreases from 1995 to 
2002 for the French and the UK markets and from 1989 to 2002 for the Portuguese 
market. Table 1 reports the number of dividend events classified by sample selection 
criteria. The Portuguese final sample contains 380 events: 158 increases, 121 decreases 
and 101 no change observations. The French final sample has 356 events: 235 increases, 
62 decreases and 59 no change observations. Finally, the UK sample contains 3,278 
events: 2,662 increases, 273 decreases and 343 no change events. The preponderance of 
dividend increases over no-change and decreases in the three samples is consistent with 
prior results that firms are reluctant to cut dividends5. The French and the UK 
percentage of dividend changes, especially the case of the UK sample, are similar to the 
ones of Abeyratna and Power (2002), for the UK market. Portuguese percentages are 
similar to the ones of some emergent markets, such as Thailand and Korea, as we can 
see below: 
  Percentage of Dividends 
Study Market Period Increases No-Change Decreases
Our Study Portugal 1989-2002 41.6 26.6 31.8 
 France 1995-2002 66.0 16.6 17.4 
 UK 1995-2002 81.2 10.5 8.3 
Nissim and Ziv (2001) US 1963-1997 38.1 59.7 2.2 
Abeyratna and Power (2002) UK 1989-1993 75.0 15.7 9.3 
Gurgul, Majdosz and Mestel (2003) Austria 1992-2002 42.3 42.3 15.4 
Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003b) Thailand 1981-1990 47.0 22.6 30.4 
 Korea 1981-1990 42.0 14.6 43.4 
 Malaysia 1981-1990 37.0 31.6 31.4 
Samples of several studies in different markets 
                                                 
4 For the UK market, dividends and earnings are usually announced in the same date. We, therefore, 
exclude the dividend events for which dividends and earnings information were announced on separate 
dates, which is a small number (6 events). In addition, we need to adapt the methodology in order to 
separate the two effects (dividends and earnings). 
5 We emphasise, for the Portuguese sample, the significant number of dividend decreases (about 32% of 
sample events). One possible explanation for these sample statistics may be the exposure of emerging and 




Table 2 provides summary statistics on dividend events and some financial ratios. We 
consider changes in dividends per share, DPS, both in monetary units and in percentage, 
the payout ratio (the ratio of the DPS to the earnings before extraordinary items per 
share) and the dividend yield (DPS divided by the share price on the day before the 
dividend announcement). We analyse the debt ratio (computed as the total debt divided 
by the total assets), the return on equity (calculated as the earnings before extraordinary 
items divided by the equity) and the current ratio (computed as the current asset divided 
by the current debt). All the accounting variables are considered at the end of the fiscal 
year before the dividend announcement.  
Comparing the values of each group of dividend events, the results show that for all the 
countries, dividend decrease events are associated with a weaker financial position than 
dividend increases, with higher debt ratios and lower ROE. Firms that neither cut nor 
increase their dividends are in a middle range. Finally, comparing the three sample 
statistics, we can see that, for all the events, the UK sample has higher DPS, is the most 
profitable sample, and presents the lowest value for the debt ratio, which is in agreement 
with a developed capital market, such as the US.   
Similar to DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) and Nissim and Ziv (2001), we observe that 
for all the countries the dividend increases, although more frequent than dividend 
decreases, are smaller in magnitude. In fact, the average decrease in DPS (percentage of 
change in DPS) is 0.35 euros (42.20%), compared with an average increase in dividends 
of nearly 0.19 euros (37.57%) in Portugal. In France, the average decrease in DPS 
(percentage of change in DPS) is 0.36 euros (23.74%), compared with an average 
increase in dividends of nearly 0.25 euros (26.37%) and finally, in the UK market, the 
average decrease in DPS (percentage of change in DPS) is 2.27 pounds (27.16%), 
compared with an average increase in dividends of nearly 1.05 pounds (19.94%).  
Overall, the evidence indicates that the UK is the main capital market of our sample and 
Portugal is the smallest one, leaving France in a middle position. 
4. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Our samples are an unbalanced panel data set. Employing the panel data methodology, 
we use the three common estimation techniques, which are the pooled ordinary least 
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squares (OLS), the fixed effects model (FEM), and the random effects model (REM).  
Subsequently, we use an F-statistic and the Hausman (1978) test to choose the most 
appropriate model for our samples. We present the standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and covariance, based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors method. 
We start by testing for the stability in the dividend policy of the different European 
countries considered in our study. Based on Omet (2004), we use the following model: 
tiiti εββαD ,1-ti,2ti,1, +D +EPS +   =           [1] 
where:  
Di,t = dividend per share i announced in year t; 
Di,t-1 = dividend per share i announced in year t-1; 
EPSi,t = earnings per share i in year t. 
 
For this test, we consider the total number of cash dividend during the sample period, 
excluding dividend events with missing data. This model allows checking if the sample 
firms follow stable cash dividend policies and compare our conclusion with the results 
of Lintner’s (1956) classical paper, as well as with other recent studies. 
Table 3 reports the estimates of Lintner’s model6. We report, for each country, the most 
appropriate specification of Lintner’s model, which is the OLS, for Portugal, and the 
FEM, for the French and the UK samples. 
For the Portuguese sample, we can see that the value of the constant term is positive and 
significant, being an indication that firms are reluctant to decrease their cash dividends, 
preferring to increase them gradually. However, the value of the lagged dividends 
coefficient is positive (0.197) but not statistically significant, showing no evidence that 
the lagged dividends determine the dividend policy. For the US market, Dewenter and 
Warther (1998) found a value of 0.945 for this coefficient and Aivazian, Booth and 
Cleary (2003a) found the value of 0.878. For Jordanian firms (an emerging market) 
Omet (2004) found a coefficient of lagged dividends of 0.480 and Aivazian, Booth and 
Cleary (2003a) found coefficients for emerging markets ranging from 0.083 (Turkey) to 
                                                 
6 We exclude the firms which did not have at least five years of cash dividend to have enough cash 
dividend years for testing stability [Dewenter and Wharther (1998)]. 
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0.611 (Zimbabwe). Benzinho (2004) found a value of 0.352 for the Portuguese market7. 
The results suggest that Portugal firms do not smooth their dividends and that the 
dividend policy for the US firms is more easily predictable than in Portugal. Finally, the 
earnings per share coefficient, although statistically significant, is low (0.079), 
especially when compared with the one of the US (0.170). In the emerging markets, the 
values range from 0.034 (Korea) to 0.446 (Turkey). Benzinho (2004) found a 
coefficient similar to ours, of 0.078.  
Turning to the French sample, the value of the lagged dividend per share is statistically 
insignificant. The speed of adjustment in this market is one of the highest, of 0.94, near 
the +1 limit in which firms do not smooth dividends. The earnings per share coefficient, 
is 0.046. Although statistically significant, it is lower than the one found for the 
Portuguese sample. On the whole, these results suggest that, in accordance to the 
Portuguese results, dividend policy in France is not about smoothing dividends.  
Finally, Lintner’s model works remarkably well for the UK firms with an adjusted R2 of 
94.4%, suggesting that dividend policy for the UK firms is highly predictable. The 
coefficient of the lagged dividend per share is positive and statistically significant, with 
a value of 0.800, which is similar to the ones found in the US market by Dewenter and 
Warther (1998) and, by Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003a). This result is an indication 
that, like US firms, UK firms smooth dividends. The earnings per share coefficient is 
not significant. Overall, we find evidence supporting the Lintner smoothing model, 
suggesting that dividend policy for the UK firms, in accordance with the US firms, is 
highly predictable.    
Comparing the three countries, we find evidence supporting the Lintner model only for 
the UK, suggesting this market smoothes dividends. As expected, dividend policy plays a 
less significant role in signalling in Portugal and France, than in the UK. Goergen, 
Renneboog and Silva (2005) conclude that in Germany (civil law country, as Portugal 
and France), because of the concentrated ownership, firms may not need to use 
dividends as a signal, which is in agreement with our conclusion. 
                                                 
7 Benzinho (2004) has a sample of 34 firms and a total of 335 observations, for the period between 1990 
and 2002, and he opts for the REM. 
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4.1. HYPOTHESIS 1: SHARE PRICE REACTION TO DIVIDEND CHANGE 
We assume that dividends follow a random walk, so the dividend changes were used as 
the proxy for the unexpected dividend changes8. We need to adapt the methodology 
when analysing the UK sample, as UK firms usually announce both dividends and 
earnings simultaneously, making it difficult to separate out the dividend announcement 
effect from that of earnings. However, it gives the opportunity to incorporate the 
interaction of the joint signals into the analysis. Therefore, for the UK market, the 
impact of earnings announcements is examined by dividing the total sample into six 
categories: dividend increase-earnings increase (DIEI), dividend increase-earnings 
decrease (DIED), dividend no-change-earnings increase (DNCEI), dividend no-change-
earnings decrease (DNCED), dividend decrease-earnings increase (DDEI), and dividend 
decrease-earnings decrease (DDED). In the analysis, we split the UK sample into these 
groups, or consider dummy variables that distinguish the different situations in the 
regressions, in order to isolate the impact of dividend announcements and investigate 
whether dividends provide information beyond that provided by earnings 
announcements.  
The annual dividend change corresponding to the dividend announcement is defined as 
the difference between the announced dividend in year t and the prior year dividend, 









−=∆            [2] 
where: 
∆ Di,t = change of dividend per share i for year t; 
Pi,0 = price of share i in the announcement day.  
 
The announcement effect exists if abnormal returns are significant. To measure the 
market reaction to dividend change announcements we opt to consider two approaches 
to determine the abnormal returns.  
                                                 
8 We analyse the annual dividends as Datastream only provides the total yearly DPS. 
9 Although deflating the dividend change by the prior dividend is not unusual, deflating by price is more 
prevalent in the literature and is likely to be a better measure. See Nissim (2003) for an extensive 
discussion of the merits of normalizing the change in dividends by price per share. 
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Firstly, we measure the market reaction to dividend change announcements considering 
the abnormal returns calculated through the capital asset pricing model (CAPM): 
( )[ ]tf,tm,itf,ti,, R - R   R - R  β+=tiAR                                 [3] 
where: 
ARi,t = abnormal return for share i in day t; 
Ri,t = return for share i in day t; 
Rf,t = risk-free rate in day t; 
Rm,t = market return for day t; 
βi = systematic risk of share i. 
 
The parameter βi, measured as [cov (Ri,t,Rm,t)/var (Rm,t)], is estimated for each share,  by 
an OLS regression based on market model, considering the period from day t = -120 to 
day = +120, excluding the 31 days around dividend announcements (t = -15 to t = +15). 
The 3-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is used to measure the market reaction to 
the dividend announcements and is calculated surrounding the announcement date as: 
∑1
1-






tiCAR               [4] 
where t = 0 is the dividend announcement day in the stock exchange journal. If the 
information content hypothesis is correct, the CAR should be significantly different 
from zero.  
The second approach consists of determining the abnormal returns according to the buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). The abnormal return for a share is defined as the 
geometrically compounded return on the share minus the geometrically compounded 
return on the market index. Therefore, the “buy-and-hold” abnormal return for share i 













titoi RRBHAR                      [5] 
To explore the relation between the wealth effect and dividend changes, the market’s 
reaction to dividend change announcements is regressed against dividend changes. For 
the Portuguese and French samples, the following regression model is estimated: 
tii εββαCAR ,i,02i,01 +D∆  x DD +D ∆ x DI +   =3    [6a] 
where:  
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CAR3i = cumulative abnormal return for share i on the 3-day period, as 
formulated in the 2 approaches: equations [4] and [5]; 
DI = dummy variable that takes value 1 if dividend increases and zero 
otherwise; 
DD = dummy variable that takes value 1 if dividend decreases and zero 
otherwise. 
 
If dividend changes convey information about a firm’s future prospects, as suggested by 
the dividend information content hypothesis, we expect β1 and β2 to be positive and 
statistically significant. In what concerns the UK sample, we need to adapt equation [6a] 
in order to capture the influence of interactive dividend and earnings signals on the 
cumulative abnormal return of the sample events. For this purpose, the regression is 





  D  x DDED                





            [6b] 
In the regression, variables DIEI, DIED, DDEI and DDED are dummy variables which 
take the value of 1 if the situation expressed by the letters is true, and zero otherwise. 
The coefficients β1 to β4 represent the influence of the dividend changes on the 
performance measured, conditioned on the earnings behaviour. 
Table 4 provides the abnormal returns for the announcement period and other different 
periods. Panel A presents the market adjusted BHAR for dividend announcements10. 
Panel B shows the cross-sectional distribution of the three-day abnormal returns based 
on the BHAR results, the one that is common to all three samples. 
In what concerns the Portuguese sample (Panel A), for the event period and the 
dividend no change announcements, we find a non-significant BHAR. This supports the 
hypothesis that firms that leave their dividends unchanged communicate no significant 
new information to the market. In what concerns dividend change announcements, 
although dividend increases and decreases show, respectively, a positive and a negative 
return on the announcement period - which is the expected signal - the returns are only 
statistically significant for the case of dividend decreases, at a 10% level. The result 
concerning dividend decrease announcements suggest that they convey relevant 
information to the market. However, the lack of reaction when dividend increases are 
                                                 
10 We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns, based on the CAPM and the results were similar. For 
simplicity reasons, we do not report the results. However, they are available from authors upon request. 
 14
announced suggests that dividend increase announcements contain less relevant 
information than do dividend decrease announcements. The market reaction asymmetry 
between dividend increase and decrease announcements was also found by several 
authors, such as Aharony and Swary (1980) and Nissim and Ziv (2001). One feasible 
reason is the managerial reluctance to cut or omit dividends.  
Concerning the other periods considered, dividend no changes has a significant value 
for the abnormal return in the period preceding the announcement date (-5 to -2), 
indicating market anticipation. The market reaction to dividend decrease 
announcements is reinforced in the period -2 to +2, since the abnormal return is 
significant at 1%, which suggests that the market reacts in the five days surrounding the 
announcement date. Finally, it seems that the market reacts later in the case of dividend 
increase announcements, since the BHAR value is statistically different from zero in the 
period (+2 to +5), which suggests some inefficiency of the market.  
In what concerns the French sample, all CARs for the announcement period present 
insignificant values. This evidence is similar to Lasfer and Zenonos (2004) who also 
obtain statistically insignificant share price reactions around the dividend announcement 
dates in this market. The insignificant abnormal returns on the announcement period 
could be attributed to the low levels of information asymmetry, as firms tend to be 
family owned, with bank-based systems and with high ownership concentration.  
Overall, the results are in accordance with the ones of the Portuguese sample, 
suggesting that the need to use dividends as a signalling device must be less pronounced 
in France and in Portugal than in the US and UK. 
We divide the UK sample into 6 categories, as we have mentioned before. A summary 
of descriptive statistics for these groups is provided below: 
Category Nº of observations 
% of the 
events 
% of total 
observations 
DIEI 1,931 72.5 58.9 
DIED 731 27.5 22.3 
DI 2,662 100.0 81.2 
DNCEI 141 41.1 4.3 
DNCED 202 58.9 6.2 
DNC 343 100.0 10.5 
DDEI 108 39.6 3.3 
DDED 165 60.4 5.0 
DD 273 100.0 8.3 
Total 3,278  100.0 
Summary descriptive statistics for the six group events of the UK sample  
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The DIEI group dominates the entire sample (58.9 percent), with the DIED, DNCED 
and DDED groups each representing a minority of the total number of events studied. 
Our relative values are similar to the ones found by Abeyratna and Power (2002). 
The abnormal returns for the UK sample are also presented in Panel A of Table 4, but 
considering the different six groups defined above. The abnormal returns for the three-
day announcement period only support the dividend-signalling hypothesis for the 
dividend increase events. The DIEI and DIED samples earned statistically significant 
positive abnormal returns of, respectively, 1.74% and 1.92%. These results are similar 
to several tests made in the US and the UK, namely the ones found by Abeyratna and 
Power (2002) and Lasfer and Zenonos (2004) for the UK market. The other events 
present exceptions to the results expected by the dividend-signalling hypothesis. Both 
the dividend no-change groups as well as the dividend decrease groups present a 
significant positive excess return. If no dividend news is being signalled to the market, 
one might assume that no abnormal share price movements are expected. However, in 
the DNCEI case, we might suppose that the earnings increase announcement has a 
stronger power than the dividend no-change announcements, and the prices go up by the 
influence of the earnings increase, which may be an indication that earnings have an 
information utility behind that of the dividend announcements.  But in contrast with this 
indication, the DNCED group also has a positive and significant abnormal return. 
Abeyratna and Power (2002) found also positive excess returns for these two groups, 
but they found no significant values. Similar to the conclusion of Lonie et al. (1996), 
this could happen because investor’s doubts about dividends disappear when firms 
announce dividends maintenance. 
One surprising result is that dividend decreases brought on positive reactions. Indeed, 
the dividend decrease results are in contrast with several works that found a negative 
and significant abnormal return for dividend decrease announcements, such as Dhillon 
and Johnson (1994) and Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) for the US market 
and Abeyratna and Power (2002) and Lasfer and Zenonos (2004) for the UK market. 
However, these last authors found a negative value for the DDED group, but a positive 
abnormal return for the DDEI sample, although not statistically significant, which is 
mentioned by them as an exception to the dividend-signalling hypothesis. Perhaps this 
is an indication that dividend decreases not always reveal bad news, sending, 
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sometimes, good news to the market. The investors might interpret them as an attempt 
to keep resources for future growth opportunities [Mozes and Rapaccioli (1998)] or an 
effort from managers to solve financial problems. Moreover, the dividend decreases 
could also be smaller than expected by the market, which reacts positively [Abeyratna 
and Power (2002)]. All excess returns are statistically significant in the periods -2 to +2 
and -5 to +5, which suggests that the market reacts also in a longer period surrounding 
the announcement date.  
Overall, the results of the abnormal returns for the UK market are in accordance with 
the dividend-signalling hypothesis only for the case of dividend increases samples. As 
in previous evidence, the market reacts strongly to dividend decreases announcements. 
The larger market reaction to dividend changes happens in the UK market, which is in 
accordance Miller and Rock (1985) opinion, as they suggested that firms whose shares 
have a larger reaction to dividends should be those that have a stronger information 
asymmetry, and the UK has higher information asymmetry than France and Portugal.    
Panel B of Table 4 presents the cross-sectional distribution of the three-day abnormal 
returns for the three samples. Results show that for the dividend increase events, 
45.57% of the cases for Portugal, 45.96% for France and 37.80% and 38.71% of the 
cases for the UK, respectively for the DIEI and DIED cases, have negative excess 
returns which is consistent with several authors that have found a negative perverse 
relationship between dividend change announcements and share prices reactions, such 
as Asquith and Mullins (1983), who found a value of 31.9%, Dhillon and Johnson 
(1994), 40%, and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch (1997) who found that 42.5% of the firms 
that initiate dividend payments have negative excess returns. Recently, Dhillon, Raman 
and Ramírez (2003) found that about 43% of the dividend increases announcements 
sample presents an adverse market reaction.  
For the case of dividend decreases, results show that 39.67% (Portugal), 53.23% 
(France) and 57.41% and 59.39% of these events for the UK, respectively for the DDEI 
and DDED cases, have positive excess returns. Benesh, Keown and Pinkerton (1984) 
and Born, Moser and Officer (1988) have found that about 20 to 60% of the sample 
events presents a market positive reaction to dividend decrease announcements. Dhillon 
and Johnson (1994) and Sant and Cowan (1994) found, respectively, a percentage of 
27% and 23.4% of the events with a positive reaction to dividend omission 
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announcements. The high percentage of dividend decrease events with positive excess 
returns might explain the positive abnormal return mean we found in the UK market.  
Vieira and Raposo (2007) explore the phenomenon of a negative relationship between 
dividend change announcements and the subsequent market return, showing that, for the 
UK market, there are some firm-specific factors contributing to explain the abnormal 
return. They conclude that firms with negative market reactions to dividend increase 
announcements have, on average, higher size, lower earnings growth rate and lower 
debt to equity ratios.  
In order to analyse the relation between the wealth effect and dividend changes, we 
estimate equation [6]. The output from this regression is reported in Table 5. We show 
the results considering the dependent variable as BHAR (the one calculated for all the 
three samples). The OLS is the best model for the Portuguese and the French samples. 
For the UK sample, the best one is the REM. 
For the Portuguese sample, we can see that, overall, the cross-sectional regression 
confirms the event study results. The negative slope, which captures the effects of no 
change announcements, is not statistically significant. The coefficients for dividend 
changes are positive, suggesting that the magnitude of the positive (negative) share 
price reaction increases with the intensity of the positive (negative) information being 
conveyed. However, only the coefficient on dividend increases is statistically significant 
at 1% level. This result suggests that dividend increases convey useful information to 
the market. Consequently, we reject the null hypothesis for dividend increases, 
supporting the dividend-signalling hypothesis only for this type of announcement. We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis in what concerns the dividend decreases, thus, it seems 
that the market does not understand the signal given by firms through dividend decrease 
announcements, or, at least, does not react.  
For the French sample, the cross-sectional regression confirms the event study results. 
Since none of the coefficients are statistically significant, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis and thus our results do not support the dividend-signalling hypothesis.  
Finally, we analyse the UK results. The constant term is statistically significant, 
showing a significant impact of dividend no change announcements on market reaction, 
which is not predicted by the dividend-signalling hypothesis, but could be associated 
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with investors’ doubts disappearance about dividends. In what concerns the other 
coefficients, they are all statistically insignificant.  
To evaluate the robustness of the results, we repeat the regression analysis using 
alternative deflators for dividend changes and alternative measures for the abnormal 
return. We consider the rate of change in dividend per share relative to the dividend of 
the previous year in spite of the share price and we consider the market-adjusted returns 
considering the BHAR model and β=1 for all firms. In all cases we obtain similar 
results11, so our conclusions are kept unchanged. 
The results so far do not allow rejecting the null hypothesis that dividend changes are 
not associated with a subsequent share price reaction in the same direction, at least for 
all the different types of dividend change announcements, so we do not find strong 
support to the dividend signalling hypothesis. For the UK sample, our results seem to 
be closer to the conclusions of the authors that do not find evidence of a significant 
market reaction to dividend change announcements, such as Lang and Litzenberger 
(1989), Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997), and, more recently, Conroy, Eades and 
Harris (2000), Chen, Firth and Gao (2002) and  Benartzi et al. (2005). 
4.2. HYPOTHESIS 2: DIVIDEND CHANGE AND FUTURE PERFORMANCE 
To test the relation between dividend changes and future performance, we consider 
several measures of future performance as sub-hypotheses. 
4.2.1. Sub-hypothesis 2A: Change in Earnings 
We start by considering the future earnings changes, in order to analyse the relationship 
between dividend change announcements and future earnings changes. 
We express annual earnings changes as the difference between earnings in year t and 
earnings in year t-1, scaled by the book value of equity at the end of year t-112. The 












E             [7] 
                                                 
11 For simplicity reasons, the results are not reported in the study but available from authors upon request. 
12 We scale earnings changes by the book value of equity in order to compare our results with the ones of 
Nissim and Ziv (2001) and Benartzi et al. (2005), among others. Moreover, see Nissim and Ziv (2001, p. 
2117) for an explanation of the merits of deflating the earnings changes by the book value of equity. 
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where: 
Ei,t = earnings before extraordinary items for share i in year t; 
BVi,t-1 = book value of equity for share i at the end of year t-1. 
 
We define year 0 as the fiscal year of the dividend announcement and use earnings 
before extraordinary items to eliminate the transitory components of earnings.  
We examine the relation between dividend changes and future earnings changes based 
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where: 
Ei,τ = earnings before extraordinary items for share i in year τ relative to 
the dividend event year (year 0); 
τ = 1 and 2; 
BVi,-1 = book value of equity for share i at the end of year -1; 
ROEi,τ-1 = return on equity for share i, calculated as Ei,τ-1/ BVi,τ-1. 
 
For the UK market, we adapt the regression in order to consider the influence of 
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Regression [8] includes return on equity and past changes in earnings to control for the 
mean reversion of earnings. However, these regressions assume that the relation 
between future earnings and past earnings levels and changes is linear, which is 
inappropriate. Consequently, we use the modified partial adjustment model suggested 
by Fama and French (2000) as a control for the non-linearity in the relation between 
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where: 
DFEi,0 = ROEi,0 – E[ROEi,0]; 
E[ROEi,0] = fitted value from the cross-sectional regression of ROEi,0 on the 
log of total assets in year -1, the market-to-book ratio of equity in 
year -1, and ROEi,-1; 
CEi,0 = (E i,0 – E i ,-1) / BV i,-1; 
NDFED0 = dummy variable that takes value 1 if DFEi,0 is negative and 0 
otherwise; 
PDFED0 = dummy variable that takes value 1 if DFEi,0 is positive and 0 
otherwise; 
NCED0 = dummy variable that takes value 1 if CEi,0 is negative and 0 
otherwise; 
PCED0 = dummy variable that takes value 1 if CEi,0 is positive and 0 
otherwise. 
We consider regression [8], which allows for distinct coefficients on the different types 
of dividend events and controls for the earnings variations in the dividend change year. 
To examine whether dividend changes contain additional information on future earnings 
changes, we consider the earnings changes, deflated by the book value of equity as an 
additional control variable. Since we identify dividend events (dividend increases, 
decreases, and no-changes) up to 2002, and we have earnings data also until 2002, the 
sample includes dividend events that occurred until 2001 for τ=1 and until 2000 for τ=2. 
Assuming linear mean reversion in earnings13, we could not reject the null hypothesis 
that dividend increases (decreases) are not associated with future earnings increases 
(decreases) for both the Portuguese and the French samples. In the UK sample, we 
reject the null hypothesis for some of the coefficients on dividend changes, which is 
partially consistent with Nissim and Ziv (2001), Benartzi et al. (2005) and Dhillon, 
Raman and Ramírez (2003). Consequently, we find weak support for the information 
content of dividend hypothesis only for the UK market.  
Table 6 reports the re-estimated coefficients of the regression models using the Fama 
and French (2000) methods in order to overcome the problem of the mean reversion 
process of earnings being non-linear, according to regression [9]. The best model for 
each regression is highlighted. 
The results for the Portuguese sample show that only for the second year following the 
dividend changes (τ =2), the coefficient on dividend increases is statistically significant. 
For the French sample, none of the coefficients on dividend changes is statistically 
                                                 
13 The results are not reported in the study, but available from authors upon request. 
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significant. For the UK sample, only for τ = 1 there are significant coefficients on 
dividend changes. Both the coefficients on dividend decreases, independently of the 
earnings changes, are negative and statistically significant. All the other coefficients are 
not significant. Consistent with the findings of Fama and French (2000) and Benartzi et 
al. (2005), this evidence indicates that the linear model misses some information about 
the behaviour of earnings that seems to be correlated with dividend changes.  
Accounting for non-linearity in the mean reversion process, leads to the conclusion that 
changes in dividends are not very useful in predicting future earnings changes. In 
general, the results do not give strong support to the assumption of dividend 
signalling hypothesis that dividend change announcements are positively related with 
future changes in earnings. These results are quite similar to the ones of Benartzi et al. 
(2005), who conclude that, after controlling for the non-linear patterns in the behaviour 
of earnings, dividend changes contain no information about future earnings.  
4.2.2. Sub-hypothesis 2B: ROA, ROE, D/E, Working Capital, Cash Flow 
We consider a regression similar to [8], but with five different dependent variables 
measuring aspects of financial performance: two profitability measures (the return on 
assets (ROA) and ROE); a gearing measure (the debt to equity ratio D/E); a liquidity 
measure (working capital ratio, WCR) and a cash flow (CF) measure. The following 
regression model is estimated: 
tiiii PMPM ,i,-1i,041-,3i,02i,011-,,  )PM -(PM  PM D  x DD D  x DI    εββββα τττ +++∆+∆+=-        [10a] 
where: 
PMi,τ = profitability measure that consists of five financial performance 
measures (ROA, ROE, D/E, WCR and CF) at date τ; 
τ = 1 and 2; 
ROAi,τ = return on assets for share i, computed as operating income before 
depreciation divided by book value of assets at the end of year τ; 
ROEi,τ = return on equity for share i, at the end of year τ; 
D/Ei,τ = debt to equity ratio for share i, calculated as the book value of total 
debt divided by the total book capital at the end of year τ; 
WCRi,τ = working capital ratio for share i, computed as total current assets 
divided by total current liabilities at the end of year τ; 
CFi,τ = cash flow for share i, computed as operating income before 
depreciation minus interest expense, income taxes and preferred 
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The estimation results of regression [10] are shown in Table 7, from Panel A to Panel E, 
respectively for the profitability measures of ROA, ROE, D/E, WCR and CF. For 
simplicity reasons, we present only the best model for each regression, being in most of 
the regressions, the FEM. In almost all cases, the coefficients on the lagged performance 
measure are negative and statistically significant, showing a negative relationship 
between the lagged performance and the future change in these performance measures.  
The most significant regressions are the regression on ROE for the UK, on WCR for 
Portugal and on Cash Flow for the French sample. However, globally, the results fail to 
reject the null hypothesis associated with H2B for several coefficients on dividend 
changes for the three markets, in particular for the French market. It suggests that 
dividends may not always contain information about future profitability. Therefore, we 
do not find strong evidence of the dividend signalling hypothesis. For the cases in which 
we reject the null hypothesis, we find stronger evidence of a negative relationship 
between dividend changes and future performance measures. Thus, in general, our 
evidence gives no support to the dividend signalling hypothesis which predicts a 
positive association between dividend change announcements and subsequent 
performance measures. Instead, our results provide some support to the window 
dressing phenomenon and the maturity hypothesis [Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan 
(2002)], as well as the free cash flow hypothesis [Jensen (1986)], since the evidence of 
declining return on assets is consistent with firms increasing their cash payouts in 
anticipation of a declining investment opportunity set as predicted by the free cash flow 
hypothesis. 
4.2.3. Sub-hypothesis 2C: Operating Performance 
In agreement with the signalling (maturity) hypothesis assumptions, we expect dividend 
increases to be associated with superior (inferior or, at least, not superior) operating 
performance, increases in capital expenditure (decreases or, at least, not increases) and 
with an increase (decrease) in sales growth.  
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We measure the operating performance by the ROA [Grullon, Michaely and 
Swaminathan (2002)], the capital expenditure (CE) is calculated as a percentage of the 
beginning-of-year total assets, and the sales growth rate (SG) is the change in sales as a 
percentage of previous year’s sales. Our intention is to test if the variables’ post-
announcement behaviour is in agreement with the predictions of the signalling 
hypothesis or the maturity hypothesis.  
We examine the determinants of the market reaction to dividend increase 
announcements and focus the analyses on the extent to which the market reaction 
anticipates the operating performance, capital expenditures and changes in sales growth. 
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where: 
∆DIi,0 = dividend increase changes per share i in the announcement year;  
∆ROAi,2 = measure of the abnormal change in profitability during the two 
years after dividend changes, computed as (∆ROAi,2 + ∆ROAi,1 )/2 
– ∆ROAi,0; 
SGi,0 = sales growth rate for share i, computed as a percentage of the 
previous year’s sales; 
∆SGi,2 = change in SG during the two years after the dividend changes, 
computed as (∆SGi,2 + ∆SGi,1 )/2 – ∆SGi,0; 
CEi,0 = capital expenditure for share i, calculated as capital expenditures 
to the beginning of year total assets; 
∆CEi,2 = change in CE during the two years after the dividend changes, 
computed as (∆CEi,2 + ∆CEi,1 )/2 – ∆CEi,0. 
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If investors, at least partially, recognise the relationship between current dividend 
increases and future changes in profitability, capital expenses and sales growth, then this 
should be reflected in the market reaction, and the coefficients will be significant. The 
                                                 
14 The equation is based on Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) model. 
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results of regression [11] are shown in Table 8, considering the market reaction as the 
BHAR measure15. 
We can see that the announcement period returns are negatively and significantly 
related to dividend increases in France. All the other coefficients on dividend increases 
are essentially zero. These results are consistent with the ones obtained in Table 5. In 
what concerns the performance coefficients, we can see a strong positive relationship 
between the market reaction and current, as well as future, capital expenditures for the 
two markets which consider these two variables in the regression: France and the UK  in 
the sub-sample of DIEI. In the DIED sub-sample none of the coefficients are 
statistically significant. In the Portuguese sample, we find a strong negative relationship 
between the market reaction and current, as well as future, change in ROA. These 
results suggest that investors recognise some relationship between current dividend 
increases and future changes in profitability, in the case of the Portuguese sample, and 
capital expenditures, in the French and the UK markets. Grullon, Michaely and 
Swaminathan (2002) and Lai, Song and Fung (2004) found evidence of a strong 
negative relationship between CAR and future changes in return on assets, as we find in 
the Portuguese sample. The reason why the market reacts positively when investors 
anticipate a firm’s future profitability to decline could be, as suggested by Grullon, 
Michaely and Swaminathan (2002, p. 438), “an expected decrease in the agency costs of 
free cash flows”16. This point of view is closer to the maturity hypothesis.  However, the 
positive relationship between the market reaction to dividend increase announcements 
and current and future capital expenditures in the French and the UK samples showing 
that the market reacts positively when investors anticipate firm’s capital expenditures to 
increase is closer to the signalling hypothesis. Investors can react positively to dividend 
increases expecting that managers have good prospects about future opportunities in 
positive NPV projects.  
                                                 
15 We consider also the CAR measure, and the results are similar. We have analysed the correlation 
between coefficients. For simplicity reasons, we do not report the results. However, they are available 
from authors upon request.  
16 When a firm is in the maturity stage, it is very likely that it has excess cash. The managers can either 
pay it out or invest the excess cash in projects with negative NPV. Investors may interpret the dividend 
increase announcements as good news that managers are not going to waste the excess resources 
investing in negative NPV projects.    
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Vieira (2005) split her dividend increases sample according to the post-announcement 
ROA: the top performance group, the middle and the bottom performance group, to see 
whether the signalling and the maturity hypothesis can co-exist. She found some 
evidence of the signalling hypothesis in the top performance group. Furthermore, she 
finds evidence that investors react differently to the two distinct groups in the 
Portuguese and in the French market (although in a weaker proportion in the last one). 
In the UK sample, a difference in behaviour is not so clear. These results give weak 
support to the evidence that the market reacts differently to the distinct groups. Her 
results are consistent with the ones of Lai, Song and Fung (2004).   
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Summarising the results, we reached the following main conclusions: 
- The abnormal returns for the three-day announcement period only support the 
dividend content hypothesis for the dividend increase events in the UK market. This is 
in agreement with the expected results that the need to use dividends as a signalling 
device must be less pronounced in France and in Portugal than in the UK. The results 
obtained are consistent with several studies, namely Goergen, Renneboog and Silva 
(2005), Lasfer and Zenonos (2004) and Abeyratna and Power (2002);  
- There are a significant percentage of cases where dividend change announcements and 
share price reactions move in opposite directions. This evidence is consistent with the 
findings of Dhillon and Johnson (1994), Sant and Cowan (1994) and Healy, Hathorn 
and Kirch (1997), among other authors;  
- The regression results do not allow rejecting the null hypothesis that dividend changes 
are not associated with a subsequent market reaction in the same direction for all the 
different types of dividend change announcements, so we do not find strong support to 
the dividend signalling hypothesis. Our results seem to be closer to those authors who 
do not find evidence of a significant market reaction to dividend change 
announcements, such as Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler 
(1997), and, more recently, Conroy, Eades and Harris (2000), Chen, Firth and Gao 
(2002) and Benartzi et al. (2005); 
- For the Portuguese and the French market, we find evidence that dividend change 
announcements have no influence on future earnings. For the UK market, we find 
only weak support for the information content of dividend hypothesis. The UK results 
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suggest that earnings announcements have information power beyond that of dividend 
announcements, consistent with the findings of Lonie et al. (1996), DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Skinner (1992) and Conroy, Eades and Harris (2000);    
- Additional tests give no support to the dividend signalling hypothesis but, instead, 
provide some support for the window dressing phenomenon and the maturity 
hypothesis [Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002)]. This evidence is stronger 
for the UK market. 
Overall, we do not find support to the dividend signalling content hypothesis, which is 
consistent with some recent studies, such as those of DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner 
(1996), Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997), Abeyratna and Power (2002) and 
Benartzi et al. (2005). The fragile support we find in some tests is associated with the 
UK market that leads us to believe that in countries with concentrated ownership (such 
as France and Portugal), firms do not need to use dividends as a signal, which is in 
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Table 1 - Sample Selection 
This table reports the number of dividend events for the Portuguese, the French and the UK samples, 
classified by sample selection criteria. To be included in the final sample, a dividend announcement must 
satisfy the following criteria: 1) The firm is not a financial institution; 2) The firm is listed on the 
respective stock exchange the year before and two years after the dividend events; 3) The firm’s financial 
data is available on the Datastream or Dhatis (in the Portuguese sample) database at the year before and 
two years after the dividend events; 4) The firm paid an annual ordinary dividend in the current and 
previous year; 5) For the Portuguese and French samples, the dividend, earnings or other potentially 
contaminating announcements did not occur within 5 trading days of each other. For the UK firms we 
consider the same condition, except for earnings announcements. As they are simultaneous in almost the 










Total number of dividend events 210 139 180 529 
Dividend events with other dividend types declaration events 4 5 8 17 
Dividend events with firms not listed in the stock exchange the 









Dividend events which earnings or other potentially 
contaminating announcements occurs within 5 days of the 













Dividend events with missing data 4 6 1 11 
Total excluded dividend events 52 38 59 149 
Total number of dividend events for analysis 158 101 121 380 
Events Percentage (%) 41.58 26.58 31.84 100.00
French Sample 
Total number of dividend events 539 317 200 1,056 
Missing announcement dates on Bloomberg 240 243 116 599 
Dividend events with other dividend types declaration events 2 1 0 3 
Dividend events with firms not listed in the stock exchange the 
year before and two years after the events 
12 5 5 22 
Dividend events which earnings or other potentially 
contaminating announcements occurs within 5 days of the 













Dividend events with missing data - - - - 
Total excluded dividend events 304 258 138 700 
Total number of dividend events for analysis 235 59 62 356 
Events Percentage (%) 66.01 16.57 17.42 100.00
UK Sample 
Total number of dividend events 2,838 380 341 3,559 
Missing announcement dates on Bloomberg 124 26 62 212 
Dividend events with other dividend types declaration events 20 2 4 26 
Dividend events with firms not listed in the stock exchange the 
year before and two years after the events 
1 1 1 3 
Dividend events which potentially contaminating announcements 
(except earnings announcements) occurs within 5 days of the 













Dividend events which dividends and earnings information were 
announced on separate dates 
4 2 0 6 
Dividend events with missing data 3 2 0 5 
Total excluded dividend events 176 37 68 281 
Total number of dividend events for analysis 2,662 343 273 3,278 
Events Percentage (%) 81.21 10.46 8.33 100.00
 32
Table 2 - Summary Statistics 
This table reports some descriptive statistics for dividend event observations during the sample period. 
DPS is the dividend per share. Dividend changes are the changes in DPS relative to the previous year, 
calculated both in monetary units and in percentage. Payout ratio is the DPS divided by the earnings 
before extraordinary items per share. Dividend yield is the DPS divided by the share price on the day 
before the dividend announcement. Debt ratio is the total debt divided by the total assets. Return on 
equity is the earnings before extraordinary items divided by the equity. Current ratio is the current asset 
divided by the current debt. All the accounting variables are considered at the end of the fiscal year before 






















 All dividend events (N = 380) 
Mean 0.458 -0.031 2.055 0.641 0.132 0.389 0.089 1.989
Median 0.349 0.000 0.000 0.440 0.059 0.368 0.074 1.335
Stand. Dev. 0.624 0.771 46.153 1.251 0.288 0.213 0.086 3.055
 Dividend increases (N = 158) 
Mean 0.631 0.193 37.573 0.458 0.145 0.367 0.109 2.261
Median 0.449 0.100 20.000 0.318 0.073 0.343 0.091 1.410
Stand. Dev. 0.902 0.776 42.093 0.698 0.346 0.205 0.086 4.075
 No changes (N = 101) 
Mean 0.350 0.000 0.000 0.539 0.136 0.432 0.078 1.920
Median 0.324 0.000 0.000 0.414 0.050 0.426 0.057 1.328
Stand. Dev. 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.693 0.238 0.216 0.079 2.338
 Dividend decreases (N = 121) 
Mean 0.322 -0.350 -42.197 0.965 0.111 0.382 0.071 1.691
Median 0.249 -0.175 -41.176 0.882 0.051 0.374 0.054 1.257





















 All dividend events (N = 356) 
Mean 1.243 0.102 13.046 0.296 0.020 0.247 0.051 1.365
Median 0.860 0.055 9.222 0.180 0.018 0.248 0.045 1.177
Stand. Dev. 1.267 0.498 32.848 2.672 0.016 0.136 0.040 0.541
 Dividend increases (N = 235) 
Mean 1.319 0.250 26.367 0.371 0.021 0.246 0.052 1.392
Median 0.910 0.130 15.797 0.166 0.018 0.246 0.046 1.205
Stand. Dev. 1.336 0.417 30.497 3.244 0.018 0.133 0.038 0.537
 No changes (N = 59) 
Mean 1.148 0.000 0.000 0.202 0.020 0.237 0.054 1.301
Median 0.830 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.018 0.214 0.049 1.190
Stand. Dev. 0.995 0.000 0.000 0.335 0.013 0.142 0.039 0.504
 Dividend decreases (N = 62) 
Mean 1.042 -0.362 -23.742 0.098 0.019 0.265 0.042 1.324
Median 0.640 -0.150 -18.7686 0.224 0.016 0.276 0.037 1.097
Stand. Dev. 1.218 0.680 22.163 1.007 0.012 0.140 0.046 0.589
(Continue) 
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 All dividend events (N = 3278) 
Mean 8.474 0.661 13.906 0.509 0.035 0.207 0.131 1.478
Median 6.355 0.500 9.655 0.429 0.030 0.186 0.133 1.302
Stand. Dev. 7.930 2.061 32.355 0.812 0.024 0.164 0.201 0.922
 Dividend increases (N = 2662) 
Mean 8.757 1.047 19.941 0.453 0.032 0.208 0.145 1.446
Median 6.550 0.650 11.355 0.415 0.028 0.186 0.141 1.290
Stand. Dev. 8.189 1.780 31.606 0.273 0.021 0.165 0.191 0.822
 No change (N = 343) 
Mean 7.432 0.000 0.000 0.902 0.048 0.182 0.061 1.702
Median 6.000 0.000 0.000 0.630 0.044 0.169 0.074 1.339
Stand. Dev. 6.113 0.000 0.000 2.381 0.029 0.147 0.207 1.532
 Dividend decreases (N = 273) 
Mean 7.103 -2.272 -27.160 0.621 0.044 0.229 0.042 1.489
Median 5.165 -1.070 -20.471 0.483 0.036 0.213 0.072 1.363
Stand. Dev. 7.282 3.088 23.434 0.627 0.034 0.178 0.230 0.713
 
Table 3 - Lintner Model Estimations 
This table reports the regression of current earnings per share and the previous dividend per share on 
current dividend per share. Di,t is the dividend per share i announced in year t; Di,t-1 is the dividend per 
share i announced in year t-1 and EPSi,t is the earnings per share i in year t. The table presents the results 
obtained with the most appropriate model: the pooled OLS, FEM or REM. The numbers in parentheses 
are the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) method. It reports the F test, a 
test for the equality of sets of coefficients, and the Hausman (1978) test, a test with H0: random effects are 
consistent and efficient, versus H1: random effects are inconsistent, in order to choose the most 
appropriate model for each particular sample.  
 
 
tiiti εββαD ,1-ti,2ti,1, +D +EPS +   =  
Coefficient Portugal  France  UK  
 Pooled OLS FEM FEM  
Constant 0.289 *     
 (4.216)      
Earnings 0.079 * 0.046  0.012  
 (2.674)  (1.816)  (1.277)  
Lagged Dividends 0.197  0.060  0.800 * 
 (1.224)  (0.535)  (11.217)  
N 383  978  3,348  
Adjusted R2 0.093  0.799  0.944  
Test F 1.14  9.57 * 1.85 * 
Hausman Test 59.66 * 283.64 * 334.59 * 
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
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Table 4 - Abnormal returns for the announcement period 
This table reports the abnormal returns for the announcement period and for different event periods. 
Market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (Panel A) for the dividend events of the three samples are 









tibtoai RRBHAR )1()1( ,,)  (  
where BHARi (a to b) is the  abnormal return for share i from time a to b; Ri,t is the return for share i in day t 
and Rm, is the market return for day t. The market return is based on the PSI-Geral Index for Portugal, 
CAC-40 Index for France and FTSE-100 Index for the UK. t-Statistics are calculated based on the cross-
sectional variance in the mean abnormal return and are reported in parentheses. In Panel B we have the 




Panel A: BHAR mean for different periods 
  Sample Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
  Size Days -5 to -2 Days -2 to +2 Days -1 to +1 Days-5 to +5 Days +2 to +5 
Portugal 
Increases N = 158 0.0042 0.0055  0.0034    0.0136**      0.0056***
  (1.233) (1.361) (1.172) (2.389) (1.804) 
Non-Changes N = 101     0.0077** -0.0009 -0.0022     0.0101*** 0.0045 
  (2.148) (-0.219) (-0.638) (1.790) (1.277) 
Decreases N = 121 0.0000   -0.0108*   -0.0056*** -0.0074 -0.0019 
    (-0.014) (-2.648) (-1.755) (-1.376) (-0.555) 
France 
  Sample Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
  Size Days -5 to -2 Days -2 to +2 Days -1 to +1 Days-5 to +5 Days +2 to +5 
Increases N = 235 -0.0043 0.0010 0.0019 0.0032    0.0060** 
  (-1.465) (0.301) (0.737) (0.774) (2.175) 
Non-Changes N = 59 0.0077    0.0094*** 0.0051   0.0164*** 0.0032 
  (1.146) (1.843) (0.971) (1.716) (0.598) 
Decreases N = 62 0.0070 -0.0052 -0.0025 -0.0026     -0.0080***
    (1.300) (-0.704) (-0.400) (-0.209) (-1.818) 
UK 
  Sample Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
  Size Days -5 to -2 Days -2 to +2 Days -1 to +1 Days-5 to +5 Days +2 to +5 
DIEI N=1,931  0.0053*  0.0211*  0.0174*  0.0279*   0.0045* 
  (5.271) (11.684) (10.704) (12.534) (4.273) 
DIED N = 731     0.0043**   0.0237*  0.0192*  0.0289*  0.0056* 
  (2.450) (7.603) (6.544) (7.746) (2.917) 
DNCEI N = 141 0.0024   0.0336*  0.0288*  0.0436*       0.0112***
    (0.650) (4.422) (4.551) (4.374) (1.921) 
DNCED N= 202 0.0047  0.0266*  0.0220*  0.0312* 0.0044 
  (1.401) (4.309) (3.846) (4.123) (1.210) 
DDEI N= 108 0.0009     0.0173**    0.0195**   0.0189*** -0.0013 
  (0.185) (2.157) (2.567) (1.896) (-0.260) 
DDED N= 165   0.0150*  0.0241*   0.0187*  0.0403* 0.0052 
  (3.508) (3.437) (2.901) (4.167) (1.085) 
     (Continue) 
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 




Table 4 - Abnormal returns for the announcement period (continued) 
 
 
Panel B - Cross-sectional distribution of 3 day abnormal returns for dividend change announcements 
Portugal 
  Dividend Increases Dividend Non-Changes    Dividend Decreases 
Size of 3-day Nº % Cum. Nº % Cum.  Size of 3-day Nº % Cum.  
Abnormal Return of of % of of of % of Abnormal Return of of % of 
(AR) Events Events Events Events Events Events (AR) Events Events Events 
 N=158   N=101    N=121   
AR < -0.12 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.12 < AR 1 0.83 0.83 
-0.12 ≤ AR < -0.06 3 1.90 1.90 7 6.93 6.93 0.06 < AR ≤ 0.12 5 4.13 4.96 
-0.06 ≤ AR < -0.04 5 3.16 5.06 4 3.96 10.89 0.04 < AR ≤ 0.06 1 0.83 5.79 
-0.04 ≤ AR < -0.02 19 12.03 17.09 7 6.93 17.82 0.02 < AR ≤ 0.04 15 12.40 18.18 
-0.02 ≤ AR < 0.00 45 28.48 45.57 32 31.68 49.50 0.00 < AR ≤ 0.02 26 21.49 39.67 
0.00 ≤ AR < 0.02 52 32.91 78.48 31 30.69 80.20 -0.02 < AR ≤ 0.00 44 36.36 76.03 
0.02 ≤ AR < 0.04 20 12.66 91.14 12 11.88 92.08 -0.04 < AR ≤ -0.02 9 7.44 83.47 
0.04 ≤ AR < 0.06 7 4.43 95.57 3 2.97 95.05 -0.06 < AR ≤ -0.04 12 9.92 93.39 
0.06 ≤ AR < 0.12 5 3.16 98.73 5 4.95 100.00 -0.12 < AR ≤ -0.06 8 6.61 100.00
0.12 ≤ AR 2 1.27 100.00 0 0.00 100.00 AR ≤ -0.12 0 0.00 100.00
 158 100.00  101 100.00   121 100.00  
France 
 Dividend Increases Dividend Non-Changes  Dividend Decreases 
Size of 3-day Nº % Cum. Nº % Cum.  Size of 3-day Nº % Cum.  
Abnormal Return of of % of of of % of Abnormal Return of of % of 
(AR) Events Events Events Events Events Events (AR) Events Events Events 
 N=235   N=59    N=62   
             AR < -0.12  2 0.85 0.85 0 0.00 0.00 0.12 < AR 1 1.61 1.61 
-0.12 ≤ AR < -0.06 9 3.83 4.68 4 6.78 6.78 0.06 < AR ≤ 0.12 2 3.23 4.84 
-0.06 ≤ AR < -0.04 13 5.53 10.21 4 6.78 13.56 0.04 < AR ≤ 0.06 7 11.29 16.13 
-0.04 ≤ AR < -0.02 35 14.89 25.11 6 10.17 23.73 0.02 < AR ≤ 0.04 7 11.29 27.42 
-0.02 ≤ AR < 0.00 49 20.85 45.96 11 18.64 42.37 0.00 < AR ≤ 0.02 16 25.81 53.23 
0.00 ≤ AR < 0.02 60 25.53 71.49 13 22.03 64.41 -0.02 < AR ≤ 0.00 9 14.52 67.74 
0.02 ≤ AR < 0.04 42 17.87 89.36 8 13.56 77.97 -0.04 < AR ≤ -0.02 10 16.13 83.87 
0.04 ≤ AR < 0.06 9 3.83 93.19 10 16.95 94.92 -0.06 < AR ≤ -0.04 5 8.06 91.94 
0.06 ≤ AR < 0.12 15 6.38 99.57 3 5.08 100.00 -0.12 < AR ≤ -0.06 4 6.45 98.39 
0.12 ≤ AR 1 0.43 100.00 0 0.00 100.00              AR ≤ -0.12 1 1.61 100.00
 235 100.00  59 100.00   62 100.00  
   (Continue) 
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Table 4 - Abnormal returns for the announcement period (continued) 
 


















Size of 3-day Nº % Cum. %  Nº % Cum. % Nº % Cum. % Nº % Cum. % Size of 3-day Nº % Cum. % Nº % Cum. %  
Abnormal Return Events of of Events of of Events of Of Events of of Abnormal Return Events of of Events of of 
(AR) N=1,931 Events Events N=731 Events Events N=141 Events Events N=202 Events Events (AR) N=108 Events Events N=165 Events Events 
             AR < -0.12 52 2.69 2.69 28 3.83 3.83 1 0.71 0.71 8 3.96 3.96 0.12 < AR 12 11.11 11.11 15 9.09 9.09 
-0.12 ≤ AR < -0.06 117 6.06 8.75 51 6.98 10.81 10 7.09 7.80 11 5.45 9.41 0.06 < AR ≤ 0.12 14 12.96 24.07 26 15.76 24.85 
-0.06 ≤ AR < -0.04 104 5.39 14.14 41 5.61 16.42 9 6.38 14.18 12 5.94 15.35 0.04 < AR ≤0.06 12 11.11 35.19 14 8.48 33.33 
-0.04 ≤ AR < -0.02 195 10.10 24.24 61 8.34 24.76 20 14.18 28.37 18 8.91 24.26 0.02 < AR ≤ 0.04 12 11.11 46.30 24 14.55 47.88 
-0.02 ≤ AR < 0.00 262 13.57 37.80 102 13.95 38.71 11 7.80 36.17 30 14.85 39.11 0.00 < AR ≤0.02 12 11.11 57.41 19 11.52 59.39 
0.00 ≤ AR < 0.02 321 16.62 54.43 102 13.95 52.67 25 17.73 53.90 29 14.36 53.47 -0.02 < AR ≤ 0.00 16 14.81 72.22 19 11.52 70.91 
0.02 ≤ AR < 0.04 264 13.67 68.10 87 11.90 64.57 14 9.93 63.83 15 7.43 60.89 -0.04 < AR ≤ -0.02 11 10.19 82.41 17 10.30 81.21 
0.04 ≤ AR < 0.06 193 9.99 78.09 80 10.94 75.51 12 8.51 72.34 27 13.37 74.26 -0.06 < AR ≤ -0.04 5 4.63 87.04 8 4.85 86.06 
0.06 ≤ AR < 0.12 301 15.59 93.68 123 16.83 92.34 23 16.31 88.65 31 15.35 89.60 -0.12 < AR ≤ -0.06 12 11.11 98.15 16 9.70 95.76 
0.12 ≤ AR 122 6.32 100.00 56 7.66 100.00 16 11.35 100.00 21 10.40 100.00 AR ≤ -0.12 2 1.85 100.00 7 4.24 100.00 
 1,931 100.00  731 100.00  141 100.00  202 100.00   108 100.00  165 100.00  
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Table 5 - Regression of market reaction on dividend changes  
This table reports the regression of dividend changes on market’s reaction. BHAR3 is the buy and hold 
accumulated abnormal return on the 3-day period as calculated by equation [5]; ∆Di,t, is the dividend per 
share change for year t; DI is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if dividend increases and zero 
otherwise; DD is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if dividend decreases and zero otherwise; DIEI is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if both dividend and earnings increase and zero otherwise; DIED is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if dividend increases and earnings decrease and zero otherwise; DDEI 
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if dividend decreases and earnings increases and zero otherwise; 
DDED is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if both dividend and earnings decrease and zero otherwise. 
The table presents the results estimated using pooled OLS, FEM and REM. The numbers in parentheses 
are the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) method. It reports the F test, a 
test for the equality of sets of coefficients, and the Hausman (1978) test, a test with H0: random effects are 
consistent and efficient, versus H1: random effects are inconsistent, in order to choose the most 
appropriate model for each particular sample. 
tiiBHAR ,i,02i,01 D  x DD D  x DI    3 εββα +∆+∆+=  
Portugal 
Coefficient Pooled OLS FEM REM 
Constant -0.001  -0.001 
 (-0.414)  (-0.217) 
DI     0.011*    0.014* 0.013 
  (9.457) (6.381) (1.522) 
DD  0.007 0.003 0.004 
 (1.252) (0.633) (0.334) 
N 380 380 380 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.011 0.224 
Test F 1.05   
Hausman Test  0.76  
France 
Coefficient Pooled OLS FEM REM 
Constant 0.002 0.003 
 (0.966) (0.915) 
DI -0.103  -0.950* -0.349 
 (-0.437) (-3.641) (-1.287) 
DD  0.109  0.668* 0.259 
 (0.855) (3.637) (1.428) 
N 356 356 356 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.026 0.237 
Test F 1.12  






  D  x DDED                





Coefficient Pooled OLS FEM REM 
Constant    0.019*  0.020* 
 (11.900) (9.055) 
DIEI 0.026 -0.541 -0.276 
 (0.070) (-1.528) (-0.855) 
DIED  -0.322      -0.863*** -0.611 
 (-0.732) (-1.960) (-1.542) 
DDEI -0.223 -0.158 -0.195 
 (-1.110) (-0.645) (-0.698) 
DDED 0.006 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.034) (-0.026) (-0.039) 
N 3,278 3,278 3,278 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.039 0.163 
Test F   1.26*  
Hausman Test 7.27  
              *; **;*** Significantly different from zero at the 1% ; 5%; 10%  level   
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 Table 6 - Regression of earnings changes on dividend changes using Fama and 
French Approach 
This table reports the estimation of a regression relating earnings changes to dividend changes using the 
Fama and French (2000) approach to predict expected earnings. Eτ denotes earnings before extraordinary 
items in year τ (year 0 is the event year). BV-1 is the book value of equity at the end of year -1; ∆ Dt is the 
annual change in the cash dividend payment, scaled by the share price in the announcement day; ROEτ is 
equal to the earnings before extraordinary items in year τ scaled by the book value of equity at the end of 
year τ; DFE0 is equal to ROE0 – E[ROE0], where E[ROE0] is the fitted value from the cross-sectional 
regression of ROE0 on the log of total assets in year -1, the market-to-book ratio of equity in year -1, and 
ROE-1; CE0 is equal to (E0 – E-1)/BV-1. NDFED0 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if DFE0 is 
negative and 0 otherwise; PDFED0 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if DFE0 is positive and 0 
otherwise; NCED0 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if CE0 is negative and 0 otherwise; PCED0 is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if CE0 is positive and 0 otherwise; DI (DD) is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. The regressions were estimated 
using the pooled OLS, FEM or REM. The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics corrected for 
heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) method. It reports the F test, a test for the equality of sets of 
coefficients, and the Hausman (1978) test, a test with H0: random effects are consistent and efficient, 






























Coefficient Pooled OLS  FEM  REM  
 τ = 1
Constant 0.009    0.011  
 (1.129)    (0.832)  
DI x ∆Di,0 0.008  0.018  0.010  
 (0.940)  (1.617)  (0.356)  
DD x ∆D i,0 -0.002  0.056  0.027  
 (-0.062)  (1.416)  (0.386)  
N 364  364  364  
Adjusted R2 0.596  0.613  0.679  
Test F 1.19     
Hausman Test  69.97 *   
 τ = 2
Constant -0.005    -0.005  
 (-0.539)    (-0.306)  
DI x ∆Di,0 0.151 * 0.050  0.106  
 (3.402)  (0.574)  (0.762)  
DD x ∆D i,0 -0.055  -0.006  -0.027  
 (-0.817)  (-0.083)  (-0.264)  
N 347  347  347  
Adjusted R2 0.108  0.052  0.256  
Test F 0.76     
Hausman Test  23.24 *   
            * Significantly different from zero at the 1% level        (Continue) 
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Table 6 - Regression of earnings changes on dividend changes using Fama and 


























⎛ ++++∆+∆+=−  
France 
Coefficient Pooled OLS  FEM  REM  
 τ = 1
Constant 0.002    0.003  
 (0.527)   (0.411)  
DI x ∆Di,0 0.180  0.053  0.078  
 (0.670)  (0.206)  (0.196)  
DD x ∆D  i,0 -0.069  -0.098  -0.117  
 (-1.716)  (-0.774)  (-0.465)  
N 310  310  310  
Adjusted R2 0.166  0.456  0.610  
Test F 2.75 *    
Hausman Test  32.38 *   
 τ = 2
Constant -0.002    0.002  
 (-0.260)   (0.213)  
DI x ∆Di,0 0.771  0.306  0.452  
 (1.213)  (0.736)  (0.793)  
DD x ∆D  i,0 -0.084  -0.141  -0.148  
 (-0.520)  (-0.960)  (-0.337)  
N 236  236  236  
Adjusted R2 0.058  0.077  0.413  
Test F 1.05     
Hausman Test  7.45    
UK 
Coefficient Pooled OLS  FEM  REM  
 τ = 1 
Constant -0.013    -0.023 *** 
 (-1.271)    (-1.857)  
DIEI x ∆Di,0 -1.339  -0.856  -1.089  
 (-1.141)  (-0.633)  (-0.671)  
DIED x ∆Di,0 -1.096  0.144  -0.585  
 (-0.529)  (0.075)  (-0.295)  
DDEI x ∆D  i,0 -7.169 ** -8.048 ** -7.417 * 
 (-2.473)  (-2.532)  (-5.020)  
DDED x ∆D  i,0 -1.671 *** -2.131 ** -1.905 ** 
 (-1.945)  (-2.491)  (-2.101)  
N 2,811  2,811  2,811  
Adjusted R2 0.071  0.077  0.149  
Test F 28.11 *    
Hausman Test  132.37 *   
 τ = 2 
Constant -0.003    -0.005  
 (-0.221)    (-0.294)  
DIEI x ∆Di,0 2.293  1.959  2.146  
 (1.355)  (1.076)  (0.984)  
DIED x ∆Di,0 -0.142  -0.363  -0.234  
 (-0.062)  (-0.168)  (-0.086)  
DDEI x ∆D  i,0 1.356  0.005  0.876  
 (0.297)  (0.002)  (0.401)  
DDED x ∆D  i,0 -0.332  -0.661  -0.443  
 (-0.539)  (-0.899)  (-0.385)  
N 2,360  2,360  2,360  
Adjusted R2 0.011  0.004  0.124   
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 7 - Regression of profitability measures changes on dividend changes 
This table reports estimates of regressions relating some profitability measures to dividend changes. ROEτ 
is equal to the earnings before extraordinary items in year τ scaled by the book value of equity at the end 
of year τ (Panel A); ROAi,τ is equal to the operating income before depreciation in year τ scaled by book 
value of assets at the end of year τ (Panel B); D/Ei,τ is the debt to equity ratio calculated as the book value 
of total debt in year τ divided by the total book value at the end of year τ (Panel C); WCRi,τ is the working 
capital ratio, computed as total current assets in year τ divided by total current liabilities at the end of year τ (Panel D); CFi,τ is the cash flow, computed as operating income before depreciation less interest 
expense, income taxes and preferred stock dividends scaled by the total assets at the end of year τ (Panel 
E); ∆ Di,t is the annual change in the cash dividend payment, scaled by the share price in the 
announcement day; DI is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if dividend increases and 0 otherwise; 
DD is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if dividend decreases and 0 otherwise; DIEI is a  dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if both dividend and earnings increase and zero otherwise; DIED is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if dividend increases and earnings decrease and zero otherwise; DDEI is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if dividend decreases and earnings increases and zero otherwise; 
DDED is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if both dividend and earnings decrease and zero otherwise. 
The table presents the results obtained with the most appropriate model: the pooled OLS, FEM or REM. 
The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) 
method. It reports the F test, a test for the equality of sets of coefficients, and the Hausman (1978) test, a 
test with H0: random effects are consistent and efficient, versus H1: random effects are inconsistent, in 
order to choose the most appropriate model for each particular sample.  
Panel A: 
tiτiτiτi εββββαROA ,i,-1i,041-,3i,02i,011-,,  + )ROA - (ROA  +ROA +D∆  x DD +D ∆ x DI +   =ROA -  
Portugal 
Coefficient   FEM 
  τ = 1 τ = 2 
Constant      
      
DI x ∆Di,0  -0.015 * -0.014  
  (-2.656)  (-0.436)  
DD x ∆Di,0  -0.013  -0.032  
  (-0.801)  (-1.297)  
ROA i,τ-1  -0.651 * -0.597 * 
  (-8.096)  (-8.525)  
ROA i,0-ROA i,-1  0.132 *** -0.007  
  (1.764)  (-0.113)  
N  364  347  
Adjusted R2  0.323  0.246  
Test F  2.02 *   
Hausman Test   33.73 * 60.10 * 
France 
Coefficient   FEM 
Constant      
      
DI x ∆Di,0  -0.036  0.098  
  (-0.218)  (0.982)  
DD x ∆Di,0  -0.133  -0.239 *** 
  (-0.875)  (-1.918)  
ROA i,τ-1  -0.934 * -1.046 * 
  (-5.435)  (-6.671)  
ROA i,0-ROA i,-1  0.223 * 0.030  
  (2.973)  (0.419)  
N  310  235  
Adjusted R2  0.274  0.541  
Test F  1.66 *   
Hausman Test   32.72 * 77.55 * 
(Continue) 
*; **;*** Significantly different from zero at the 1% ; 5%; 10%  level 
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Table 7 - Regression of profitability measures changes on dividend changes 
(continued) 
Panel A: 
tiτiτiτi εββββαROA ,i,-1i,041-,3i,02i,011-,,  + )ROA - (ROA  +ROA +D∆  x DD +D ∆ x DI +   =ROA -  
UK 
Coefficient   FEM 
  τ = 1 τ = 2 
Constant      
      
DIEI x ∆Di,0  -0.392  -0.096  
  (-1.255)  (-0.214)  
DIED x ∆Di,0  -1.334 * -0.694  
  (-2.643)  (-1.607)  
DDEI x ∆Di,0  -0.203  0.866  
  (-1.027)  (1.153)  
DDED x ∆Di,0  -0.149  0.165  
  (-0.745)  (0.783)  
ROA i,τ-1  -0.741 * -0.813 * 
  (-13.905)  (-14.984)  
ROA i,0-ROA i,-1  -0.001  0.052  
  (-0.022)  (1.454)  
N   2,809  2,360  
Adjusted R2   0.314  0.365  
Test F   1.86 * 1.91 * 
Hausman Test   258.39 * 117.45 * 
 
Panel B: 
tiiiiROE ,i,-1i,041-,3i,02i,011-,,   )ROE - (ROE  ROE D  x DD D  x DI    ROE - εββββα τττ +++∆+∆+=  
Portugal 
Coefficient   REM  FEM  
   τ = 1  τ = 2  
Constant  -0.565 ***   
  (-1.808)    
DI x ∆Di,0  -0.046  0.072  
  (-0.111)  (1.000)  
DD x ∆Di,0  -0.283  0.027  
  (-0.271)  (0.743)  
ROE i,τ-1  -1.398  -0.816 * 
  (-1.567)  (-5.481)  
ROE i,0-ROE i,-1  1.354  0.033  
  (0.719)  (0.195)  
N  364  347  
Adjusted R2  0.343  0.283  
Test F  1.78 * 1.77 * 
Hausman Test  6.14  123.77 * 
(Continue) 
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 7 - Regression of profitability measures changes on dividend changes 
(continued) 
Panel B: 
tiiiiROE ,i,-1i,041-,3i,02i,011-,,   )ROE - (ROE  ROE D  x DD D  x DI    ROE - εββββα τττ +++∆+∆+=  
France 
Coefficient   FEM 
   τ = 1  τ = 2  
Constant     
     
DI x ∆Di,0  -0.153  0.051  
  (-0.543)  (0.248)  
DD x ∆Di,0  -0.245  -0.022  
  (-0.903)  (-0.151)  
ROE i,τ-1  -0.820 ** -1.353 * 
  (-2.121)  (-5.887)  
ROE i,0-ROE i,-1  -0.001  -0.099  
  (-0.003)  (-0.697)  
N  310  235  
Adjusted R2  0.260  0.620  
Test F  2.07 * 4.38 * 
Hausman Test  45.3 * 59.14 * 
 
Panel B: 
tiiiiROE ,i,-1i,041-,3i,02i,011-,,   )ROE - (ROE  ROE D  x DD D  x DI    ROE - εββββα τττ +++∆+∆+=  
UK 
Coefficient   FEM 
   τ = 1  τ = 2  
Constant      
      
DIEI x ∆Di,0  -2.666 ** -0.454  
  (-2.559)  (-0.472)  
DIED x ∆Di,0  -2.471 ** -4.803 ** 
  (-2.267)  (-2.573)  
DDEI x ∆Di,0  2.836  1.758  
  (1.495)  (0.934)  
DDED x ∆Di,0  0.242  -0.026  
  (0.350)  (-0.033)  
ROE i,τ-1  -0.975 * -0.881 * 
  (-16.401)  (-18.282)  
ROE i,0-ROE i,-1  0.115 * -0.007  
  (2.766)  (-0.219)  
N  2,817  2,366  
Adjusted R2  0.378  0.428  
Test F  2.01 * 2.70 * 
Hausman Test  85.12 * 96.18 * 
(Continue) 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 




Table 7 - Regression of profitability measures changes on dividend changes 
(continued) 
 
Panel C: tiτiτiτi εββββαED ,i,-1i,041-,3i,02i,011-,,  + )D/E - (D/E  +D/E +D∆  x DD +D ∆ x DI +   =D/E - /  
Portugal 
Coefficient   FEM 
   τ = 1  τ = 2  
Constant     
     
DI x ∆Di,0  0.066  0.306  
  (1.143)  (0.508)  
DD x ∆Di,0  0.219  0.581  
  (0.700)  (1.549)  
ROE i,τ-1  -0.654 * -0.841 * 
  (-3.194)  (-6.481)  
ROE i,0-ROE i,-1  0.022  -0.078  
  (0.164)  (-1.006)  
N  364  347  
Adjusted R2  0.230  0.397  
Test F  1.26 *** 2.6 * 
Hausman Test  63.63 * 29.75 * 
France 
Coefficient   FEM  Pooled OLS  
   τ = 1  τ = 2  
Constant    3.955 ** 
    (2.294)  
DI x ∆Di,0  -4.974  2.786  
  (-1.212)  (0.107)  
DD x ∆Di,0  7.437 ** -7.275  
  (2.306)  (-1.056)  
D/E i,τ-1  0.016  -3.900 ** 
  (0.043)  (-2.200)  
D/E i,0-D/E i,-1  -0.441  1.053  
  (-1.560)  (0.900)  
N  310  235  
Adjusted R2  0.169  0.553  
Test F  1.67 * 1.12  
Hausman Test   19.46 * 71.08  
          (Continue) 
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 7 - Regression of profitability measures changes on dividend changes 
(continued) 
Panel C: tiτiτiτi εββββαED ,i,-1i,041-,3i,02i,011-,,  + )D/E - (D/E  +D/E +D∆  x DD +D ∆ x DI +   =D/E - /  
UK 
Coefficient   FEM 
   τ = 1  τ = 2  
  
Constant      
      
DIEI x ∆Di,0  -0.252 * 1.444  
  (-6.569)  (0.573)  
DIED x ∆Di,0  0.078 * 1.724  
  (3.342)  (0.541)  
DDEI x ∆Di,0  0.082 * -4.763  
  (4.779)  (-1.185)  
DDED x ∆Di,0  -0.000  -0.753  
  (-0.587)  (-0.552)  
ROE i,τ-1  -0.001  -0.747 * 
  (-0.650)  (-9.246)  
ROE i,0-ROE i,-1  0.000  -0.086  
  (0.053)  (-1.608)  
N  2,797  2,350  
Adjusted R2  0.149  0.305  
Test F  2.57 * 1.89 * 
Hausman Test  46.52 * 19.16 * 
 
Panel D: 
tiτiτiτi εββββαWCR ,i,-1i,041-,3i,02i,011-,,  + ) WCR- (WCR  + WCR+D∆  x DD +D ∆ x DI +   = WCR-  
Portugal 
Coefficient   Pooled OLS 
   τ = 1  τ = 2  
Constant  1.766 * 2.106 * 
  (4.380)  (5.598)  
DI x ∆Di,0  -0.322  -4.563 ** 
  (-1.084)  (-2.085)  
DD x ∆Di,0  3.618 ** 3.100 * 
  (2.340)  (2.785)  
ROE i,τ-1  -0.674 * -0.868 * 
  (-4.874)  (-13.704)  
ROE i,0-ROE i,-1  -0.200  0.051 *** 
  (-1.623)  (1.904)  
N  364  347  
Adjusted R2  0.421  0.441  
Test F  0.65  0.54  
Hausman Test  26.97 * 25.5 * 
 (Continue) 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 7 - Regression of profitability measures changes on dividend changes 
(continued) 
Panel D: 
tiτiτiτi εββββαWCR ,i,-1i,041-,3i,02i,011-,,  + ) WCR- (WCR  + WCR+D∆  x DD +D ∆ x DI +   = WCR-  
France 
Coefficient   FEM  Pooled OLS  
   τ = 1  τ = 2  
Constant   0.220 * 
   (3.377)  
DI x ∆Di,0  4.273 ** -0.686  
  (2.216)  (-0.449)  
DD x ∆Di,0  -8.838 *** 6.288  
  (-1.693)  (1.608)  
D/E i,τ-1  -0.816 * -0.181 * 
  (-10.294)  (-3.511)  
D/E i,0-D/E i,-1  0.045  0.020  
  (0.696)  (0.273)  
N  309  235  
Adjusted R2  0.195  0.114  
Test F  1.44 ** 1.20  
Hausman Test   145.71 * 52.8 * 
UK 
Coefficient   FEM 
   τ = 1  τ = 2  
Constant      
      
DIEI x ∆Di,0  -1.180  3.769 ** 
  (-0.698)  (2.018)  
DIED x ∆Di,0  -0.714  4.167  
  (-0.298)  (1.601)  
DDEI x ∆Di,0  1.041  -0.712  
  (1.279)  (-0.771)  
DDED x ∆Di,0  -0.341  -0.065  
  (-0.423)  (-0.080)  
ROE i,τ-1  -0.699 * -0.718 * 
  (-15.937)  (-17.473)  
ROE i,0-ROE i,-1  0.090 * -0.028  
  (2.912)  (-1.050)  
N  2,625  2,204  
Adjusted R2  0.290  0.321  
Test F  2.73 * 2.87 * 
Hausman Test  56.47 * 57.94 * 
          (Continue) 
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 7 - Regression of profitability measures changes on dividend changes 
(continued) 
 
Panel E: tiτiτiτi εββββαCF ,i,-1i,041-,3i,02i,011-,,  + )CF - (CF  +CF +D∆  x DD +D ∆ x DI +   =CF -  
Portugal 
   FEM Pooled OLS 
   τ = 1  τ = 2  
Constant   0.005 * 
   (2.761)  
DI x ∆Di,0  -0.015 * -0.010  
  (-4.413)  (-0.412)  
DD x ∆Di,0  -0.007  0.005  
  (-0.857)  (0.797)  
ROE i,τ-1  -0.637 * -0.235 ** 
  (-3.549)  (-2.440)  
ROE i,0-ROE i,-1  0.186  -0.014  
  (1.640)  (-0.329)  
N  364  347  
Adjusted R2  0.487  0.046  
Test F  2.02 * 1.06  
Hausman Test  43.77 * 37.47 * 
France 
Coefficient   FEM 
   τ = 1  τ = 2  
Constant     
     
DI x ∆Di,0  0.144  -0.139  
  (0.959)  (-0.741)  
DD x ∆Di,0  0.037  0.043  
  (0.329)  (0.549)  
ROE i,τ-1  -1.107 * -0.789 * 
  (-10.713)  (-6.660)  
ROE i,0-ROE i,-1  0.208 * -0.176  
  (3.770)  (-1.106)  
N  310  235  
Adjusted R2  0.491  0.515  
Test F  2.83 * 3.05 * 
Hausman Test  131.20 * 29.52 * 
          (Continue) 
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
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Table 7 - Regression of profitability measures changes on dividend changes 
(continued) 
 
Panel E: tiτiτiτi εββββαCF ,i,-1i,041-,3i,02i,011-,,  + )CF - (CF  +CF +D∆  x DD +D ∆ x DI +   =CF -  
UK 
Coefficient   FEM 
   τ = 1  τ = 2  
Constant      
      
DIEI x ∆Di,0  -0.104  0.067  
  (-0.599)  (0.349)  
DIED x ∆Di,0  -0.284  -0.454 ** 
  (-1.615)  (-2.051)  
DDEI x ∆Di,0  0.047  -0.016  
  (0.543)  (-0.123)  
DDED x ∆Di,0  0.227 ** 0.077  
  (2.452)  (0.667)  
ROE i,τ-1  -0.604 * -0.718 * 
  (-10.453)  (-12.293)  
ROE i,0-ROE i,-1  0.045  0.128 * 
  (0.971)  (2.769)  
N  2,759  2,306  
Adjusted R2  0.293  0.373  
Test F  2.47 * 3.00 * 





* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 





 Table 8 - Regression of cumulative abnormal returns on future performance 
measures 
This table reports estimates of regressions relating some profitability measures and dividend increases to 
abnormal return for the full dividend increases sample, as well as the top and bottom performance groups, 
considering the dependent variable as BHAR. BHAR3 is the buy and hold accumulated abnormal return 
on the 3-day period as calculated by equation [5]; ∆DIi,0 is the dividend increases per share i for year 0; 
∆DIEIi,0 is the dividend increase per share i for year 0 when earnings increases; ∆DIEDi,0 is the dividend 
increase per share i for year 0 when earnings decreases; ROAi,t is the ROA for share i in year t; ∆ROAi,2 is 
the measure of the abnormal change in profitability during the two years after the dividend changes, 
computed as (∆ROAi,2 + ∆ROAi,1 )/2–∆ROAi,0; CEi,0 is the capital expenditure for share i, calculated as 
capital expenditures to the beginning of year total assets; ∆CEi,2 is the change in CE during the two years 
after the dividend changes, computed as (∆CEi,2 + ∆CEi,1 )/2 – ∆CEi,0; SGi,0 is the sales growth rate for 
share i, computed as a percentage of the previous year’s sales; ∆SGi,2 is the change in SG during the two 
years after the dividend changes (∆SGi,2 + ∆SGi,1 )/2 – ∆SGi,0. The table presents the results obtained with 
the most appropriate model: pooled OLS, FEM and REM. The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics 
corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) method. It reports the F test, a test for the equality 
of sets of coefficients, and the Hausman (1978) test, a test with H0: random effects are consistent and 
efficient, versus H1: random effects are inconsistent, in order to choose the most appropriate model for 









                  






   Portugal    
Coefficient   FEM    
Constant       
       
∆DIi,0   0.018    
   (1.126)    
ROAi,0 - ROAi,-1   -0.325 **   
   (-2.136)    
∆ROAi,2   -0254    
   (-2.335) **   
SGi,0 - SGi,-1   0.005    
   (0.325)    
∆SGi,2   0.009    
   (0.821)    
N   147    
Adjusted R2   0.178    
Test F   2.29 *   
Hausman Test   45.32 *   
(Continue) 
  
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
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  REM    
Constant  0.008    
  (1.510)    
∆DIi,0  -0.749 **   
  (-2.074)    
ROAi,0 - ROAi,-1  -0.053    
  (-0.293)    
∆ROAi,2  0.088    
  (0.630)    
SGi,0 - SGi,-1  -0.026    
  (-1.061)    
∆SGi,2  -0.011    
  (-0.624)    
CEi,0  - CEi,-1  0.706 *   
  (3.231)    
∆CEi,2  0.526 *   
  (2.861)    
N  173    
Adjusted R2  0.476    
Test F  1.38 ***   
Hausman Test   3.93    
UK 
   DIEI DIED 
Coefficient   FEM  Pooled OLS  
Constant    0.017 * 
    (3.658)  
∆DIEIi,0  -0.798  -0.860  
  (-1.403)  (-0.990)  
ROAi,0 - ROAi,-1  0.056  0.020  
  (0.770)  (0.186)  
∆ROAi,2  -0.019  -0.088  
  (-0.366)  (-1.085)  
SGi,0 - SGi,-1  0.003  0.005  
  (0.234)  (0.206)  
∆SGi,2  -0.001  0.008  
  (-0.018)  (0.447)  
CEi,0  - CEi,-1  0.163 * 0.143  
  (2.832)  (0.903)  
∆CEi,2  0.130 ** 0.106  
  (2.413)  (0.742)  
N  1,327  431  
Adjusted R2  0.136  0.021  
Test F  1.42 * 1.00  
Hausman Test   15.01 ** 5.65  
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
 
 
 
